[55] Local questionnaire, 1921, TsGALI f. 1230, op. 1, d. 117, 1.69 ob.
[56] See the report of the Tula provincial Proletkult, July 15, 1921, TsGALI f. 1230, op. 1, d. 1538, 1.25 ob.
[57] Report by the local president at the second Tver provincial conference, 1921, TsGALI f. 1230, op. 1, d. 1525, 1.20; "O sostoianii rabot Tverskogo Proletkul'ta k I/X 22 [October 1, 1922]," d. 1527, 1. 35.
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Even the intervention of the city's Politprosvet division on the Proletkult's behalf could not mitigate union hostility. The local president, Olga Vladimirova, painted a very depressing picture. Club work was dying out and studio participants had stopped receiving rations. "Students are literally starving," she concluded.[58]
In Smolensk cultural activities were also severely restricted during 1921. The organization had no particular problems with other local groups, but it also received no help; funds from the center were simply not enough to cover costs. The Proletkult had to reduce its membership from two hundred to eighty-five and to shut down both the literature and music studios. Its one remaining regional affiliate in Iartsevo was about to close because the local Politprosvet refused to hand over funds. The Iartsevo president blamed both the central and the provincial Proletkults for his plight. They should have sent money or at least instructions on how to help his organization survive.[59]
These examples show how little central negotiations had done to stave off local crises. Indeed, some participants began to wonder if national leaders were interested in the Proletkult's continued survival as a mass organization. Despite the alarming news coming in from the provinces, Pletnev could still describe the Proletkult's decline in 1921 as "normal," a choice of words that implied that the expansion during the Civil War had been somehow abnormal. According to this interpretation the crisis was in fact an opportunity to cleanse the organization of its alien elements. However, Pletnev would soon be shocked to discover that the Proletkult's collapse had only just begun.
[58] "Material k istorii Proletkul'ta," TsGALI f. 1230, op. 1, d. 1245, 11.6, 16; Vladimirova's report on the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Proletkult, February 2, 1922, d. 146, 1.7 ob.
[59] Questionnaire for the 1921 conference, TsGALI f. 1230, op. 1, d. 118, 11. 33, 11; report by the Proletkult head A. I. Smirnov, February 1922, d. 146, 1.11 ob.; "Anketa o roli, zadachakh i tseliakh Proletkul'ta," March 1922, d. 118, 1.62.
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The Cultural Vanguard
In the fall of 1921 Proletkult delegates gathered for yet another national congress, but this time a very different mood prevailed than just a year before. The sharp decline in resources and the resulting drop in membership had severely strained the relations between the central organization and its provincial affiliates. As if these problems were not enough, the organization faced renewed questions about its political reliability.
The first crisis broke even before the conference opened. An anonymous pamphlet titled We are Collectivists (My—kollektivisty ) came to the attention of the Proletkult central leadership and the Communist Party Central Committee. The authors, whose identity has never been established, declared themselves a Communist Party faction with links to the Proletkult and the Workers' Opposition. They denounced the New Economic Policy, accused the Communist Party of abandoning the principles of socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and claimed Bogdanov and the Vperedist tradition to be the real inspiration for communism and for the Proletkult movement.[60]
The Communist Party's reaction was swift. Bukharin published an attack in Pravda that called the platform an example of "Bogdanovian Menshevism" and denounced Bogdanov for his passive and false approach to revolutionary change. A small number of people, he warned, wanted to make the Proletkult the basis of a Menshevik revival.[61] Although the Politburo reaffirmed its earlier rulings on political orthodoxy
[60] Excerpts from the document are cited in V. V. Gorbunov, V. I. Lenin i Proletkul't (Moscow, 1974), pp. 172–74; N. Bukharin, "K s"ezdu Proletkul'ta," Pravda , November 22, 1921; and L. N. Suvorov, "Iz istorii bor'by V. I. Lenina i partii bol'shevikov protiv bogdanovskoi 'organizatsionnoi nauki,' "Filosofskie nauki , no. 3 (1966), pp. 87–89.
[61] N. Bukharin, "K s"ezdu Proletkul'ta," Pravda , November 22, 1921; Biggart, "Bukharin," pp. 236–37.
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within the Proletkult, the Proletkult's party faction published its own statement, rejecting all attempts to use the organization for "narrow group interests."[62]
The anonymous pamphlet altered the official Proletkult stance toward its most important theorist. Although Bogdanov was present as a delegate at the November gathering, he was not reelected to the Proletkult governing board. It was at this time, not in 1920, that Bogdanov was relieved of his national position.[63] Unlike Bukharin and other party critics, Pletnev never denounced Bogdanov by name, except to acknowledge that the collectivists looked to his work for inspiration. Still, he was quick to distance the Proletkult from charges of "collectivist" sympathies.
The collectivist platform was quickly pushed to the sidelines of the Proletkult conference. It is not even clear how much support it ever received. Nonetheless, the collectivists' denunciation of party policies under the New Economic Policy forced Proletkult leaders to address this dramatic shift in the country's course. By initiating an era of class compromise the New Economic Policy challenged the very reason for the Proletkult's existence. How would an organization devoted to the pursuit of proletarian dictatorship justify itself in this new social environment?
Pletnev attempted to turn this obvious weakness into a strength. He insisted that the Proletkult was more important than ever precisely because of the New Economic Policy. The economic shift encouraged the petty bourgeoisie to consolidate its alien ideology. Therefore, workers' organizations had to unite in an army against such influences, with the Proletkult taking the lead. If the New Economic Policy marked a retreat in economics and politics, the Proletkult would not
[62] The November 18, 1921, ruling is in TsGALI f. 1230, op. 1, d. 14, 1. 104. It was published in Pravda on November 23, 1921, under the title "Resoliutsiia fraktsii s"ezda Proletkul'ta."
[63] See the delegate list for the 1921 national congress, TsGALI f. 1230, op. 1, d. 144, 1.116, and Biulleten' vtorogo s"ezda , no. 2, p. 93.
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allow a retreat on the ideological front.[64] In essence, he argued that the New Economic Policy provided the Proletkult with a new and powerful justification for its continued existence.
This remarkable self-confidence in the face of hostile criticism also marked Pletnev's dealings with local Proletkult affiliates. He was determined to establish central control over local work, thereby annihilating the long-standing animosities between Moscow and the provinces. His preferred tactic was to ignore local problems altogether, brushing aside complaints that the central and Moscow organizations were appropriating most of the scarce resources for themselves.[65]
Pletnev continued to assert that institutional decline thus far had been positive and had cleansed the Proletkult of the alien elements that had crept in during the Civil War. Although it was true, he granted, that organizations like the one in the small town of Iarensk, Vologda province, were dying out, this was a positive development because there were no workers in those organizations anyway. "Maybe there is one shoemaker who is somehow organized, but that does not give us the right to have a Proletkult; we are an organization for the industrial proletariat."[66] Making the message even clearer, Pletnev proclaimed: "At the present time, under these conditions, the Proletkult cannot be a mass organization. It is and will be an organization for cultural and creative forces of the vanguard of the proletarian masses."[67]
This vanguardist vision dominated the discussions on creative work as well. None of the suggestions advanced by national leaders was suitable for a mass organization. In her presentation on club work Raisa Ginzburg stressed the need for advanced, well-educated proletarian participants. Similarly, in a long and complex lecture on the theater, Valentin
[64] Chetvertyi s"ezd professional'nykh soiuzov , p. 83; and Biulleten' vtorogo s"ezda , no. 2, pp. 73–74.
[65] Biulleten vtorogo s"ezda , no. 1, pp. 18–21.
[66] Ibid., p. 13.
[67] Ibid., no. 2, p. 77. See also ibid., no. 1, p. 39.
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Smyshliaev derisively condemned most provincial theatrical practices and insisted that the Proletkult had to back experimental projects. And Ilia Trainin, outlining existing practices in the visual arts, suggested that the Proletkult open a central training school with a rigorous four-year program.[68]
The vanguardism of Kirillov's speech on literature was particularly extreme. He wanted to disband all provincial studios and use the money to support a handful of excellent students in Moscow. Because the financial situation of even the best students was desperate, why waste money on the provinces? "The severe, cruel facts of life have shown us that those things that we hoped and dreamed about in our work are very, very far away." Rather than squandering money on untalented workers, the Proletkult should support those who had already proven themselves.[69] This radical elitism was too much even for Pletnev, who argued that the Proletkult had to remain open to those workers who dreamed of one day becoming artists.[70]
As with earlier efforts, congress resolutions outlining new relations with unions and Narkompros did little to resolve local hostilities.[71] The Communist Party was also ambivalent. In late November the Politburo sent a circular to local party committees with a mixed message about future cooperation. It urged local bureaus to support the Proletkult as "one of the party's mechanisms (apparaty ) for satisfying the proletariat's cultural demands," hardly an enthusiastic backing. At the same time, it directed Communists within the Proletkult to cleanse the organization of petty-bourgeois elements, collectivists, and the remnants of Bogdanov's philosophy.[72]
[68] On clubs see ibid., no. 1, pp. 12–16; on theater see ibid., pp. 17–40, esp. pp. 23, 33; on music see ibid., pp. 51–69; on art see ibid., pp. 40–51, esp. p. 49.
[69] Ibid., no. 2, pp. 2–6, quotation p. 2.
[70] Ibid., pp. 7–8.
[71] See reports from local Proletkults at the June 1922 Proletkult plenum discussions, TsGA RSFSR f. 2313, op, 1, d. 19, 11. 2–4; 9–9 ob.; 44–46.
[72] This November 22, 1921, statement is in TsGALI f. 1230, op. 1, d. 51, 1.7, and reprinted in Lenin o literature , p. 410.
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Finances remained the most serious problem of all, and the Proletkult's contradictory relationship to the state was only exacerbated by the fiscal crisis. Throughout its history the Proletkult had demanded independence while simultaneously insisting that the government foot the bill. But now Narkompros's resources were dwindling, and the Proletkult's continued demands for more money and more freedom of action hardly encouraged generosity. By the beginning of 1922 even national leaders had to acknowledge that the organization was in desperate straits. Appealing to Glavpolitprosvet for more funds, they claimed that they could now support no more than fifty or sixty local organizations. Any further reduction would endanger the cause of proletarian culture and the Proletkult's struggle against petty-bourgeois ideology.[73]
Finally acknowledging the gravity of the situation, in February 1922 the Proletkult leadership organized a central committee plenum. By now, all traces of optimism had faded. The delegates, from fifteen provincial cities as well as Moscow and Petrograd, were faced with the prospect of carrying out an organizational purge. The main item on the agenda was to compose a list of organizations the central Proletkult could still support. Only thirty-eight existing organizations made it on the list, with twelve new ones slated for opening (or reopening) in particularly important industrial areas.[74]
The process of elimination appears to have been fairly simple. Organizations that had not maintained close ties to the center, like those in Klin and Kursk, were struck from the list, as were those in areas without large proletarian populations. The plenum also eliminated groups that had not developed "successful" cultural programs as well as those with such
[73] "Zaiavlenie," January 10, 1922, TsGA RSFSR f. 2313, op. 1, d. 19, 1. 1.
[74] "Dlia svedeniia vsekh uchrezhdenii i organizatsii RSFSR," February 5, 1922, TsGALI f. 1230, op. 1, d. 49, 11.12–12 ob.; "Spisok Proletkul'tov utverzhdennykh plenumom Tsentral'nogo komiteta Vserossiiskogo Proletkul'ta, 2–5 fevralia, 1922 g.," d. 121, 1.2.
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serious financial problems that they required significant central support to remain in operation. The Omsk Proletkult (not represented at the conference) was summarily closed because it was in difficult financial straits and was said to have weak ties to local workers.[75] Leonid Tsinovskii, the representative from Archangel, chronicled a long history of external opposition and internal disputes in his city. With no local resources for the Proletkult to draw on the future of the Archangel organization lay in the hands of the plenum. Another local leader, Nikolai Beliaev, recounted how the Tambov Proletkult, one of the first groups, had declined at the end of the Civil War and now faced extinction unless the center promised more aid. Both the Archangel and Tambov circles were victims of the reorganization.[76]
Through this radical retrenchment the center hoped to redirect Proletkult resources to the best local organizations and to find funds for new groups in important industrial areas. The plenum also intensified the process of centralization. New allocations of staff and support openly favored Moscow and the central Proletkult administration. Narkompros had authorized rations for one thousand staff members and fifteen hundred student scholarships in 1922. The plenum gave 435 staff rations (43.5 percent) and 690 scholarships (46 percent) to Moscow and the central studios. Talented workers from the provinces would have to make their way to the capital, concluded the national Proletkult leader Vladimir Faidysh.[77]
Despite their scale even these reductions proved unrealistic. By mid-1922 Glavpolitprosvet had lowered ration sub-
[75] V. L. Soskin and V. P. Butorin, "Proletkul't v Sibiri," in Problemy istorii sovetskoi Sibiri , ed. A. S. Moskovskii (Novosibirsk, 1973), pp. 137–38.
[76] Protocols of the February 1922 plenum, TsGALI f. 1230, op. 1, d. 146, ll. 9 ob.–10 ob.; 7–7 ob.; 19 ob.–20.
[77] On staffing and scholarships see Pletnev's report at the February 1922 plenum, TsGALI f. 1230, op. 1, d. 146, ll. 2–2 ob.; on the distribution of rations, ll. 21 ob.–22. For Faidysh's comments see l. 21 ob.
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sidies by yet another third,[78] and local organizations complained that they were not receiving even these small amounts. None of the new organizations planned at the February plenum was ever opened and local closures continued. Of the twenty-six factory organizations on the official list, only ten were still in operation by the end of 1922.[79]
Continual financial difficulties forced the central organization to reassess its position once again. The plans at the February plenum had a certain logic to them—support the strongest organizations at the expense of the weak and reach out to areas with large factory populations. But there was no way to portray the continued collapse in a positive light. Reports from the provinces were grim. Local organizations were dissolving because there was no money and no one left to lead them. For example, despite the fact that it had the support of local workers, the Rostov on Don Proletkult had closed because it had no funds and repeated requests for staff had gone unanswered. The remaining students had left for Narkompros studios or the local workers' faculty. The Kuznetsov Proletkult shut down for similar reasons, even though the center had singled out Kuznetsov as a particularly important area for Proletkult work.[80]
At this point Pletnev and his colleagues agreed that it was senseless to apply to either Narkompros or the Communist Party for more aid. The only possible source of funds remaining was the union cultural bureaucracy. In order to gain more energetic labor support Pletnev proposed yet another national congress in the fall of 1922, this one to coincide with the fifth national trade union convention.[81] There was no more cutting
[78] See the letter by Vladimir Faidysh to Glavpolitprosvet, August 22, 1922, TsGA RSFSR f. 2313, op. 1, d. 19, l. 67.
[79] Compare the February 1922 list in TsGALI f. 1230, op. 1, d. 121, l. 2 ob. to figures for late 1922 in Gorn , no. 7 (1922), p. 160.
[80] Reports from the June 26–29, 1922, central plenum, TsGA RSFSR f. 2313, op. 1, d. 19, ll. 2–26.
[81] On a new agreement with unions see TsGA RSFSR f. 2313, op. 1, d. 19, ll. 2–5, 19 ob.–20 ob.; on a new conference, ll. 37, 21–30.
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to be done, and there were no more reorganizational schemes to be tried. Nonetheless, the Proletkult president still harbored the hope that if he could make his case eloquently enough, the organization would find the resources to help it survive.