[31] "O Proletkul'takh: Pis'mo TsK RKP," Pravda , December 1, 1920, reprinted in Lenin o literature , pp. 408–10.
[32] Ibid.
― 204 ―
masses, who had been fed "Machism and futurism" under the guise of proletarian culture. The party in no way wanted to stop efforts by worker-intellectuals to improve themselves in the arts. Rather, it hoped that these efforts would be placed in the hands of the laboring classes so that the workers' government could help the workers' intelligentsia.[33] When read between the lines, this statement deftly turned Proletkult leaders into the very bourgeois intellectuals they claimed to oppose. The party, not the Proletkult, emerged as the defender of "real, authentic" proletarian culture.[34]
This attack proved to have much more serious consequences for the movement than the formal loss of autonomy that had been approved at the national congress. The precise terms of the Proletkult's new bureaucratic status evolved slowly through lengthy and complicated agreements with state, union, and party organs. In the meantime, the party's critique appeared in the foremost newspaper in the country. Unlike previous criticisms, the Pravda letter discredited the organization on political grounds. In the hard winter of 1920–1921, when hunger riots and strikes erupted throughout the country, the Proletkult was branded as a potentially dangerous, anti-Soviet institution.
Responding with shock and outrage, the Proletkult central leadership drew up a response, "An Unavoidable Explanation," which it tried to publish in Pravda without success.[35] This document revealed the enormous gap between Proletkultists' self-perceptions and the central committee's views. It began somewhat disingenuously, expressing gratitude to the party for finally showing an interest in Proletkult work. But the rest of the text refuted the substance and purpose of the party's letter point by point. The Proletkult was loyal to the party and the Soviet regime, something clearly shown
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid., p. 410.
[35] "Neobkhodimoe ob"iasnenie," TsGALI f. 1230, op. 1, d. 51,1.6. On publication efforts see Lenin o literature , p. 545.
― 205 ―
by the large number of Communists in the organization. It did not shelter "anti-Marxist" groups; in fact it kept better control over its specialists than did other Soviet institutions. The presidium also insisted that the Proletkult did not promote "Machists and God-builders" because both Bogdanov and Lunacharskii had long since abandoned these ideas. Bogdanov's works were now published by government and party presses, and he was an instructor at the party-controlled Sverdlov University. Lunacharskii had inspired enough confidence to be appointed Commissar of Enlightenment. As for the charge of endorsing futurism, they had openly denounced such trends.[36]
Proletkultists were dismayed that the party had decided to print an attack that was filled with such unexpected accusations. They had heard rumors that the letter was a reaction to agitation within the Proletkult protesting the loss of institutional autonomy, but "we do not know of any publicly printed statement of this kind." In conclusion, they held out hope for better, more fruitful relations between the Proletkult and the party in the future.[37] But this plea had no effect, nor did a special delegation that urged Lenin to change his mind.[38] Its avenues for protest now exhausted, the Proletkult had no choice but to begin a painful process of reassessment.
Reorganization and Decline
The Proletkult's subordination to Narkompros irrevocably altered the movement's place in Soviet cultural life. Its claim to be the "third path" to proletarian power, bombastic in the best of times, now had lost all credence. Although few participants wanted the organization to assume a modest role as a
[36] "Neobkhodimoe ob "iasnenie."
[37] Ibid.
[38] On the delegation see Proletarskaia kul'tura , no. 20/21 (1921), p. 33; and F. Volgin's memoirs, published first in Krasnyi Krym , January 21, 1921, and reprinted in Lenin o literature , pp. 503–4.
― 206 ―
Narkompros subsection, it was difficult for them to articulate a new mission within the narrow limits set by the party and the state. To make matters worse, the party's intervention sparked discord within the organization and between the Proletkult and its numerous cultural competitors.
The first efforts to define a new identity began at a national plenum in mid-December 1920. Called to discuss the practical consequences of the party's letter, the plenum resulted in a new central leadership. Lebedev-Polianskii, the national president, found himself in a minority at the meeting. He opposed handing over discussions about organizational status to the Proletkult's party faction, perhaps because this would have excluded Bogdanov, who was not a party member. Moreover, he did not even want to consider any fundamental changes in the Proletkult's cultural direction. When his proposals were soundly defeated, Lebedev-Polianskii tendered his resignation, a move that was quickly accepted.[39]
Writing under the pseudonym of V. Kunavin shortly after his resignation, Lebedev-Polianskii took the opportunity to express his views on the Proletkult's subordination in the Narkompros journal Creation (Tvorchestvo ). He did not attack the party for its intervention, but he did wonder why it had chosen to move against the Proletkult when trade unions remained independent. As always, Lebedev-Polianskii was most critical of the state bureaucracy. The Proletkult was not strong enough to imbue Narkompros with the proletarian energy it so desperately needed; instead, it might easily acquire all of Narkompros's problems. Already Proletkult work was too similar to state programs, and unification would only increase the danger that the Proletkult would lose its distinctive character. The Proletkult should turn to factories and solicit a pure proletarian following. It should eschew education and propaganda and pursue scientific research and